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Russia’s Middle East policy after the Arab revolutions 
Marcin Kaczmarski
Russia’s policy towards the Middle East is instrumental. Its activity in the 
region has been growing since the middle of the last decade, and its aim is 
to help Moscow achieve its objectives in other areas, particularly in its poli-
cies towards the US and Europe, as well as its energy policy. The establish-
ment of these political influences constitutes a bargaining chip for Russia 
in its relations with the US. Russia’s participation in resolving conflicts is 
aimed at building up its image as a supra-regional power. Russia’s Middle 
East policy is a key element in its contacts with the Muslim world. At the 
same time, Russia’s policy in the region remains cautious – despite its re-
turn to the region, Russia has not decided to ‘play’ for the Middle East, and 
its position and role in the region remain limited. 
The balance of power in the Middle East has been shifting in the aftermath 
of the Arab revolutions. However, it does not seem that they have opened 
up larger opportunities for Russian policy in the region. The Russian elite 
has been divided in its assessment of the consequences of these events. 
One part of it has displayed scepticism, treating the revolutions rather 
as a threat than a chance to strengthen their own position. The revolutions 
were not seen as democratisation processes, but rather as a destabilisa-
tion of the region and as posing an increased danger from radical Islam. 
For the other part of the elite, the revolutions were the natural consequence 
of the social changes occurring in the region. This internal dispute made 
it difficult for Russia to present a cohesive approach to the Arab revolu-
tions, and its stance was reactive. 
The defensive position which Moscow adopted showed that Russia did not 
have the potential to mould the political situation, either in the region as 
a whole or its individual countries; neither did it display any willingness to 
do so. What Moscow is doing is positioning itself in such a way so as not to 
spoil relations with any other actor in the region, and to be able to exploit 
any possible emerging opportunities in case of further-reaching changes. 
The characteristics of Russia’s policy as pursued in the Middle East to date
After having retreated from the Middle East following the collapse of the USSR, Russia 
has begun ‘returning’ to the region since 2002, striving for a rapprochement with Muslim 
countries. The main cause of Moscow’s involvement at that time was its efforts to cut off 
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Chechen guerrillas from the Arab world’s support. Since the middle of the previous decade 
(2005-2007), Russia’s ambitions and political and economic presence in the Middle East 
have been growing substantially. The regional dimension of the commitment (the Arab- 
-Israeli peace process and the Iranian nuclear crisis) was accompanied by intensified bi-
lateral relations with practically all the actors, ranging from former Soviet-era allies (Syria), 
through actors with which Moscow had previously had relations (Egypt, Jordan, the Pales-
tinian Autonomy, Algeria, Libya), to those countries with which contacts have been estab-
lished almost from scratch (Saudi Arabia, the smaller Gulf countries). This policy has been 
complemented by close relations with non-Arab countries, namely Iran and Israel. In 2005 
Russia gained observer status in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and in 2006 
established diplomatic relations with Hamas after it had won the parliamentary elections. 
Russia’s activity in the Middle East has been ‘auxiliary’ compared to its main orientations 
in foreign policy, and has served above all to pursue its interests outside the region. 
Moscow sees the establishment of political leverage in the Middle East as a way of limiting 
American global domination, and was also intended as a bargaining chip in its relations with 
the US. Closer relations with both anti-American countries and US allies were meant to 
expand Russia’s room for manoeuvre. At the same time, Moscow did not enter into military 
alliances with any of the countries in the region, and its geopolitical position there remained 
limited (in contrast to that of the USSR). 
Arms sales have played an important role 
in building political influences; the main 
recipients were Iran, Syria, Algeria and 
Libya. These arms sales have constituted 
a bargaining chip in relations with the US, 
as was proven by the several years of bar-
gaining between Russia and the US with 
regard to the former supplying S-300 anti-
missile systems to Iran. On the other hand, technical and military co-operation with the 
countries of the region has been an element of Moscow’s policy aimed at diversifying its 
arms exports. Moscow has also put great effort into promoting sales of its arms to the Gulf 
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, but this did not bring results as these markets were 
already dominated by the US and other Western countries. 
Energy is a significant area of Russia’s activity in the Middle East due to its strategic and 
economic importance. By co-operating with the countries of the region, Moscow wanted 
to ensure a greater impact on the European Union, for which this area is the third largest 
supplier of natural gas and second largest of oil. Russia has made attempts at coordinat-
ing the policies of the largest producers, both from the Gulf (Iran, Qatar) and North Africa 
(Algeria, Libya), and has used the organisation of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum 
(GECF) for this purpose. However, due to Russia’s inconsistent policy and the specificity 
of the gas market, these attempts brought about inconsequential results. In the context of 
producing and selling oil, relations with OPEC have been important for Moscow, particularly 
with Saudi Arabia as the main (and most flexible) producer which is able to impact global 
oil supply. This co-operation was significantly hampered by Russia’s lack of willingness to 
agree the volume of its own production with OPEC. The region’s economic importance for 
Russian energy companies as the place which provides access to resources and enables 
their extraction remains restricted (despite the fact that Russian companies are present 
in nearly every country in the region). Russia is also interested in entering the nuclear en-
ergy market emerging in the Middle East (Egypt, Jordan). 
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With regard to the large and dynamically growing Muslim population in Russia and the 
importance of the Middle East as the centre of the Muslim world, the policy aimed at the 
Muslim world has been another sphere of the Kremlin’s involvement in the region. Moscow 
has been trying to ensure a legitimisation of its policy towards the North Caucasus and the 
Muslim population in general, as well as a restriction on the influx of Islamic radicalism to 
Russia. In this context, Moscow has succeeded in preventing the situation of Muslims in the 
Russian Federation from becoming a pan-Islamic issue, and the improvement in relations 
with Saudi Arabia has brought about the legitimisation which it expected (among other 
events, Chechnya’s President Ramzan Kadyrov was recognised as the legitimate leader of 
the republic by the Saudi monarchy). Equally, the position on the Palestinian issue – sup-
port for Palestinian statehood – constitutes an element of improving Russia’s image in the 
eyes of the Muslim world. As for Islamic radicalism, attention should be paid to the close 
co-operation between Russian services with their counterparts in Arab countries (but also 
in Israel), which required political endorsement. 
Above all, Russia’s policy in the region – acting as an intermediary in resolving crises – 
serves the purpose of building up its image as a global power (or at least a supra-regional 
power). Both the Kremlin’s involvement in the Iranian crisis and in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
are intended to achieve this aim. At the same time, however, Moscow has not succeeded in 
persuading Tehran to accept its idea for settling the crisis, and Russia’s initiatives regarding 
the Arab-Israeli conflict are not being implemented. Russia’s idée fixe is to organise a peace 
conference which would extend to all the actors, and serve as a manifestation of Russia’s 
return to the region as an actor on a equal footing with the US.
The balance sheet of the ‘return’ 
So far, the balance sheet of Russia’s ‘return’ to the Middle East has been equivocal. On the one 
hand, Russia has built up good relations with nearly all the actors, including those which had 
ignored it earlier. None of the countries sees Russia as an enemy power. Moscow has legiti-
mised its policy towards Muslims in Russia and won a few new customers for its arms sales. 
On the other hand, Russia’s successes remain limited: the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia 
has not translated into economic benefits; 
energy manoeuvres aimed at increasing its 
ascendancy over Europe have not brought 
any results; its actions as an intermediary 
in settling conflicts have been confined to 
declarations.I In the face of American suprem-
acy, Russia has not managed to develop its 
own sustainable influences, except on Syria, 
a country which is isolated in the West. 
This balance sheet proves that the Middle East orientation has played a secondary role, be-
ing used as an ‘auxiliary instrument’ for realising the objectives of its policy towards the US 
and Europe (as a sort of a bargaining chip) and for promoting restricted economic interests 
(support for foreign policy, limited importance for security policy). As a result of this ap-
proach and the ‘auxiliary’ character of the policy in the region – the consequent caution and 
the willingness to maintain good relations with all the crucial actors – and not committing 
important political and economic resources, the outcomes of Russia’s ‘return’ have been 
limited, both in their political and economic dimensions. 
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Russia’s approach to the region rema-
ins instrumental; Moscow is not ready 
to seriously engage politically and 
economically, therefore the results 
of its “return” to the Middle East 
have been rather limited.
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Russia and the Arab revolutions – an ambivalent position... 
The Russian government’s cautious and sceptical reaction to the events in individual 
Arab countries, which soon came to be called the ‘Arab revolution’ by the Russian media, 
showed that Moscow was taken by surprise by the situation in these countries. The posi-
tions which the Kremlin formulated revealed important divergences among the Russian elite 
in their assessment of the nature and consequences of the events in the Middle East, and 
the dominant trend was scepticism. 
On the one hand, the Russian government did not hide its distrust of the Arab revolutions. 
They were not regarded as processes of democratisation, but rather as a destabilisation of the 
region. Comparisons to the revolutions of 1989 were dismissed. The causes of the upheaval 
were attributed to external factors. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin hinted that it was the North 
African branch of al-Qaida that stood behind the events in Libya. The Russian representative 
at NATO Dmitri Rogozin pointed to the West’s ill intentions and the lack of understanding 
of the situation in Libya itself, thus hinting that Western countries were deliberately painting 
a picture of a civil war. Deputy Prime Minister Igor Siechin accused Google of instigating the 
revolution in Egypt1. As the situation in Libya deteriorated, the references to external factors 
intensified. The consequences of the revolution were seen as very negative. At the first stage of 
the revolution in Egypt in February 2011, representatives of the Russian government believed 
that if President Hosni Mubarak stepped down too soon, it would lead to radicalisation, divi-
sions and destabilisation, and that similar 
scenarios could be reproduced in Tunisia, 
Jordan, Syria and Algeria. It was thought 
that the revolutions could pave the way 
for extremists, and result in the repetition 
of the collapse of the state, as happened in 
Somalia2. In this context the revolutionary 
situation in the Arab countries was linked 
to a potential threat to the Russian state, 
above all from radical Islam. Soon after 
endorsing the changes in Egypt, President 
Dmitri Medvedev contended that the revolutions might cause fanatics to come to power, es-
calate extremism and provoke the disintegration of the Arab countries, which could also be 
dangerous for Russia. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indicated that together with the destabi-
lisation of the region, the risk was rising for Central Asia and the Russian South Caucasus, as 
even during the period of stability this region was being infiltrated from the Middle East, and if 
the state structures collapsed, this infiltration would be even stronger3. 
At the same time, another trend has appeared in the Russian government’s approach 
to the Arab revolutions which did not regard them as a threat. The revolutions’ causes 
were seen in internal social and economic processes and in the situation of the individual 
countries. This stance was probably an attempt at adjusting to the new political situation. 
The statements made by President Medvedev and Minister Lavrov should be interpreted in 
this way as, contrary to their earlier critical comments, they both emphasised their support 
for the events in Egypt, for instance; they acknowledged that a strong democratic Egypt 
was important for the peace process, and that Russia would endorse related international 
efforts. Another example of a positive assessment of the shifts in the region was President 
Medvedev’s statement in which he considered the transformations to be paving the way 
for reforms, and compared them to the implications of the fall of the Berlin Wall in Eastern 
Europe4. At the same time, it is impossible to determine how sustainable this correction of 
the negative approach to the Arab revolutions is. 
1 See Stuart Williams, Medvedev 
Warns Arab Unrest May Empo-
wer Fanatics, AFP, 22.02.2011; 
Pavel Baev, ‚The Kremlin Spins 
Conspiracy Theories Explaining 
Revolutions Away’, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, 28.02.2011; 
Western countries advocating 
intervention as pretext for oil 
grab – Russian envoy, Russia 
Today, 14.03.2011; 
2 See Senior Russian MP Warns 
Against Egyptian President’s 
Resignation, Interfax, 
3.02.2011; Simone Baribeau 
and Henry Meyer, ‘Libya May 
Risk Somalia-Like Chaos, 
Russian Deputy Premier Says’, 
Bloomberg, Johnson’s Russia 
List, -#63, 8.04.2011.
3 See ‘Arab power crisis will echo 
in Russia – Lavrov’, Johnson’s 
Russia List, -#39, 3.03.2011.
4 ‘Middle East, North Africa 
events reminiscent of fall 
of Berlin Wall’ – Medvedev, 
Johnson’s Russia List, #126, 
15.07.2011.
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5 See President Medvedev’s 
declaration about the situation 
in Libya of 21 March 2011, 
http://kremlin.ru/news/10701
6 The President’s special North 
Africa and Middle East envoy 
Mikhail Margielov met them 
in Moscow in June 2011. 
… and inconsistent actions
The divergences in the Russian elite’s evaluation of the Arab revolutions has given rise to 
inconsistency in the political measures taken by Russia. 
At the initial stage (the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt) Moscow distanced itself from the 
Arab revolutions, only issuing warnings against external intervention (although it did not 
take any action which could have prevented such a step). Russia also cautioned Western 
states against putting pressure on the Arab countries, or ‘enticing’ them to mount fur-
ther revolutions and pro-democratic movements, deeming it counterproductive. Russia also 
evaded taking any unequivocal position, awaiting a relative ‘clarification’ of the situation 
(for example, Minister Lavrov went to Cairo only in March 2011, after President Mubarak 
had resigned from power). 
The differences in the evaluation of the Arab revolutions had the strongest impact on Rus-
sia’s position on Libya. Moscow vacillated between supporting the actions undertaken by 
the international community, headed by the Western countries, and criticism of the inter-
vention in Libya’s civil war. The first approach resulted in the condemnation of the actions 
taken by the regime of Muammar Gaddafi5, voting for UNSC Resolution 1970 (which in-
troduced the arms embargo, froze assets and submitted Libya’s case to the International 
Criminal Court), and abstaining from voting for UNSC Resolution 1973, which introduced 
a no-fly zone. In the latter case, an important role was played by the Arab League which 
backed the idea of a no-fly zone. Furthermore, while supporting the approach of the West-
ern countries, President Medvedev recognised that Gaddafi had lost all legitimacy to rule. 
At the same time, Russia severely criticised the actions undertaken by the West in Libya. 
Most critical was Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who regarded Resolution 1973 as a call 
to a crusade, which lead to a public polemic with President Medvedev. Nevertheless, both 
politicians quite unanimously denounced the way in which the no-fly zone was implement-
ed, and consistently blamed the Western countries for abusing the UN resolution. Moscow 
thus took on the very comfortable position of a critic. Probable differences in how to further 
address the Libya issue prevented Rus-
sia from playing an active role in creating 
policy. Russia was not a member of the 
contact group which took decisions about 
Libya, but despite its traditional ambition 
to participate in all decision-making circles 
regarding international matters, it did not 
display any aspirations to become a member. While deeming the Libyan rebels a legitimate 
party in negotiations, and calling on the Libyan leader to step down, Moscow did not break 
off relations with the Gaddafi regime. Declarations of its readiness for mediation were ac-
companied by limited diplomatic activity which did not produce any measurable results. 
Russia adopted a more decisive position on the revolutions in Syria and Yemen. At the UN, 
Moscow was consistent in preventing a debate at the Security Council over the situation 
in the two countries and blocking any sanctions which could be imposed on them. Repre-
sentatives of the Russian government, together with President Medvedev, pledged political 
support for the leaders of both countries. At the same time, Russia tried to keep some room 
for manoeuvre in case the Syrian opposition won; contacts were established with repre-
sentatives of the Syrian opposition in immigration6.
The divergences in the Russian elite’s 
evaluation of the Arab revolutions has 
given rise to inconsistency in the politi-
cal measures taken by Russia. 
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The consequences for Russia’s Middle East policy 
The Arab revolutions have been shifting the balance of power in the Middle East, both between 
the actors in the region and the position and importance of particular external actors. Due to in-
ternal disparities, Moscow has lacked a strategy in the face of the revolution, and its reaction has 
been defensive and adaptive. Most of its actions were taken in response to the evolution of the 
political situation in the region. This approach was reflected in Moscow’s open position towards 
the opposition forces, even if it nominally supported a particular regime. Among its main achieve-
ments, then, Russia can therefore count the fact that it managed not to pit against itself any of 
the political forces in the region, especially in situations where further changes were possible. 
On the other hand, the policy Moscow has pursued to date shows that it does not have the 
potential to shape the political situation either in the region as a whole or in its individual states. 
Its policy remains reactive despite several bold diplomatic and political moves, such as the recog-
nition of Hamas. Its reaction to the revolutions indicates a lack of willingness to shape the political 
situation. Moscow seems not to expect any geopolitical benefits as a result of the revolutions and 
the resulting weakening of the US’ position, but fears their detrimental implications above all. 
Russia’s offer for the countries of the region 
has not been expanded (even in the catego-
ries of soft power, as Moscow does not have 
an attractive model of development, like Tur-
key does, for example). Moscow rather sees 
threat and risk than prospects for a new 
opening-up and growth of its influences. 
In the long term, such an approach may lead 
to Russia’s marginalisation in the region. 
At the same time, the long-term consequences of the revolutions for the Arab world remain 
undetermined. The main unknown is the share of influences between key political actors 
in the region and the role of political Islam, and thus the character of the governments 
which will be formed. As a result of further-reaching transformations, the context for Russia 
to realise its interests in the Middle East will change. Russia’s capacities for further exploita-
tion of the region in order to attain the supra-regional objectives of its foreign policy will to 
a great extent depend on the nature of the regimes which replace the current dictatorships. 
So far, the revolutions have not been anti-Western in nature, although a higher degree of 
autonomy for Egypt and other Arab countries will alone weaken American domination in the 
region. This could open up greater opportunities for Russian activity, although other coun-
tries such as China and Turkey will provide competition for Russia in this area. 
Russia’s approach to the region could significantly change if radical Islamist regimes take 
power. Moscow would thus be forced to adopt a more clear-cut position. The first option 
would be co-operation with Western countries and pro-Western states in the Middle East 
in isolating such regimes. This would likely contribute to an improvement in relations with 
Western countries in general. According to a second scenario, a rapprochement between 
Russia and such regimes could be expected, both in order to sap the domination and position 
of the West, and prevent to Russia from itself becoming a target for Islamist radicalism. 
Russia’s capacities for further exploita-
tion of the region in order to attain the 
supra-regional objectives of its foreign 
policy will to a great extent depend 
on the nature of the regimes which 
replace the current dictatorships. 
